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A PAPER TIGER: LAWSUITS
AGAINST DOCTORS FOR
NON-DISCLOSURE OF
ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN
PATIENTS' CELLS, TISSUES AND
ORGANS
In 1990, the California Supreme Court set a precedent that
limits patients' ability to sue doctors who ultimately profit from
medical research using tissue matter removed from patients. Con-
cerned that causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and lack
of informed consent are inadequate to protect patients from exploi-
tation by physician-researchers, the authors suggests that legisla-
tion coupled with stronger self-regulation by the medical communi-
ty offers a better solution.
In July 1990, the California Supreme Court threw a bone to
John Moore of Seattle, a leukemia patient seeking a share of the
profits his California doctor derived from Moore's surgically re-
moved tissue.1 The court rejected the patient's cause of action for
conversion, but allowed Moore to proceed against his physician on,
remand under either of two theories, breach of fiduciary duty or
lack of informed consent.2
The Moore decision attempts to resolve the issue of patients'
property rights in their cells, tissues and organs. The Moore court
found that patients in situations like Moore's do not own tissue
removed from their bodies3 and, further, that such patients do not
1. Don . DeBenedictis, Research-Profits Suit: Court Rules Patient has no Property
Right in his Cells, 76 A.B.A. ., Sept. 1990, at 22.
2. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
3. L1 at 489. The Court reserved the possibility for a contrary finding under other
circumstances. The court stated: "we do not purport to hold that excised cells can never
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have rights to share in any profits derived from the commercializa-
tion of that tissue.4 The California Supreme Court's opinion par-
tially overturned the 1988 appellate decision which had ruled that
Moore's complaint stated a cause of action for conversion.5 By
rejecting the argument that human tissue is property belonging to
the person from whom it has been removed, the California Su-
preme Court limited patients' ability to sue physicians who profit
from medical research using removed tissues. 6 But the court did
not foreclose the possibility of suits against researchers altogether,
since the Moore court noted that Moore would be able to proceed
with his suit alleging lack of informed consent7 or breach of fidu-
ciary duty.' However, the opinion failed to specify what Moore
must prove in order to succeed under these causes of action or
how damages would be measured under these theories.9
be property for any purpose whatsoever ... ." Id. at 493.
For the purposes of this note, "tissue" includes organs and cells.
4. See id. at 493 (reasoning that the patent issued for the cell line evidences "that the
cell line is the product of invention" unique from Moore's cells).
5. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 511 (CL App. 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 793 P.2d 479 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. CL 1388
(1991). The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's decision not to recognize
Moore's conversion theory. Id at 511-12. The Supreme Court's grant of review super-
seded the opinion of the Court of Appeal.
6. See id. at 493 (refusing to extend the theory of conversion to the use of human
cells in medical research).
7. Moore, 793 P.2d at 497.
In Justice Mosk's opinion, the failure-to-disclose cause of action is "largely illusory"
because the patient must demonstrate a causal relationship between the physician's failure
to inform and his injury. Id. at 519 (Mosk, J., dissenting). For Moore, the causal connec-
tion between his physician's failure to inform and the injury he alleged would be estab-
lished only if Moore could show that, had he known of the ongoing commercialization of
his tissue, he would have refused treatment. See infra text accompanying notes 74-75.
8. Moore, 793 P.2d at 497. The majority concluded that since the doctor breached his
fiduciary duty by not disclosing his research interests in plaintiff's bodily specimens, the
removal of plaintiff's spleen and the subsequent removal of blood, semen, bone marrow,
etc., constituted compensable injuries. Id. at 485.
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Broussard noted that Moore could, in
the alternative, demonstrate that the breach of fiduciary duty caused some other type of
compensable damage. Id. at 499 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). Broussard
argued that plaintiff could use the breach of duty as the basis for a cause of action for
conversion under traditional common law principles because he believed that the plaintiff
had a property interest in his body parts even after their removal. Id. at 501.
9. See DeBenedictis, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that Justice Panelli's majority opin-
ion does not discuss the elements of a failure-to-disclose cause of action). The majority
opinion offered this sentence regarding the remaining causes of action available to Moore:
"Any injury to [Moore's] right to make an informed decision remains actionable through
the fiduciary-duty and informed-consent theories." Moore, 793 P.2d at 496.
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The Moore case illustrates a growing controversy: whether
patients who are the source of raw material for the rapidly expand-
ing biotechnology industry have any right to share in the financial
rewards of the patents and products generated from research in
which those tissues are used." Moore's claim to a share of the
profits failed because the California Supreme Court refused to
recognize any patient ownership interest in the removed tissue, thus
precluding a tort claim for conversion."
This note explores the causes of action available to Moore and
to other patients who discover that their tissues have been used for
medical research. Providing background information regarding the
Moore case and the surrounding controversy, this note discusses
the doctrine of fiduciary responsibility and the consequences of
breaching those duties. Further, this note examines the doctrine of
informed consent and the elements required to establish a basis for
compensable damages. It applies these theories to the factual situa-
tion presented in Moore, and then propounds the various arguments
a patient might present. Finally, this note concludes that the doc-
trines of informed consent and fiduciary duty offer no real basis
10. Andrew Pollack, Living Cells Enter Commerce; Now, Who Has a Claim to Prof-
itsT?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1990, at 6E; see also Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477,
481 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Moore as an example of the problems arising in conjunction
with the explosion in the market for human tissue). In Brotherton, the Sixth Circuit exam-
ined property rights in tissue removed from dead bodies. Brotherton 923 F.2d at 479.
The plaintiffs in that case argued that an Ohio statute permitting county coroners to re-
move corneas for anatomical gifts without the consent of autopsy subjects' next of kin
violated the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 478-79. Unlike
the Moore cout, the Sixth Circuit was able to avoid the question of whether or not dead
bodies should be classified as property. Id. at 481. The court determined that the rights
granted to the decedent's surviving custodian under the Ohio law governing gifts of or-
gans and tissue for research constitute a "legitimate claim of entitlement" protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 482.
Issues surrounding gifts and donations of organs are beyond the scope of this note.
11. Moore, 793 P.2d at 487-88.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defies conversion as "an intentional exercise of
dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another
to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the
chattel." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965). From this definition, the
California courts derive three elements for a conversion action: (1) the plaintiff must
own or have a right to possess the property at the time of the alleged conversion; (2) the
defendant must have acted wrongfully in taking or disposing of the plaintiffs property
rights; and (3) the defendant's wrongful conduct must have caused damages to the plain-
tiff. Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc., 145 Cal. Rptr. 406, 416 (Ct. App. 1978).
For an examination of the doctrine of conversion as applied to the facts in Moore,
see generally Jennifer Lavoie, Note, Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, 75 VA. L. Rnv. 1363, 1373-81 (1989).
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for compensating the patient. Patients in situations like Moore's
have no enforceable right to share in profits gained from the com-
mercialization of their tissues under either doctrine. This note ar-
gues, however, that patients do have a right to adequate disclosure
of doctors' economic interests in those tissues before consenting to
treatment.
This note proposes that legislative intervention coupled with
stronger self-regulation by the medical community would more
effectively protect patients' interests than the causes of action left
to them by the California Supreme Court. Legislation and self-
regulation would not produce the severe economic repercussions in
the biotechnology industry that the Moore court feared would occur
if patients' property rights in their tissues were recognized. Rather,
steps aimed at regulating doctors' use of diagnostic specimens in
medical research would assure that patients receive full disclosure
regarding the intended use of any tissue removed during medical
treatment.
I. MOORE V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
In 1976, John Moore was diagnosed by UCLA hematologist
David Golde12 as having a rare form of cancer known as hairy
cell leukemia.13 Golde removed Moore's spleen as a necessary
part of the treatment for his disease.' 4 Golde and Shirley Quan, a
medical researcher and UCLA employee, determined that Moore's
spleen had unique qualities.15 Golde and Quan, applying genetic
engineering to cells from the spleen, developed a cell-line
16
12. Dr. Golde was the head of the Hematology-Oncology Department of the UCLA
Medical Center when he treated Moore. See David G. Savage, Court Backs Doctors'
Right to Use Patient Tissues, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1991, at A3.
13. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
Hairy cell leukemia, or leukemic reticuloendotheliosis, is a rare form of cancer
characterized by the presence of abnormal mononuclear cells in the blood, bone
marrow, and other tissues. Other characteristics include destruction of normal
blood cells, enlargement of the spleen, and infiltration of the bone marrow,
spleen, and lymph nbdes by tumor cells.
Lavoie, supra note 11, at 1365 n.12 (citation omitted).
14. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. Due to the procedural nature of the appeal, the court's
review of the facts in this case was limited to the pleadings. Id. at 480. For the purposes
of this analysis, the facts presented by the court are accepted as true.
15. See id. (noting that Moore's cells over-produced certain lymphokines, enabling re-
searchers to more easily identify the corresponding genetic material).
16. Id. A cell line is defined as "a sample of cells [that have] undergone the process
of adaptation to artificial laboratory cultivation . . . [making them] capable of sustaining
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known as the "Mo-cell line" which was capable of indefinite re-
generation.17 Moore travelled from Seattle to Los Angeles periodi-
cally between 1976 and 1983 for blood work-ups" in Golde's
office, believing that these visits were necessary for his treat-
ment. 19
In 1983, Golde filed an application to patent the Mo-cell
line.2° Subsequently, he presented Moore with previously unseen
consent forms intended to secure the release of any rights Moore
had in all cell lines or products made from his blood or bone
marrow.21 Moore signed one of two forms presented to him dur-
ing his last two visits with Golde, but refused to sign the second
form because he felt the answers he received to questions regarding
the purpose and potential value of the research involving his tissue
continuous, long-term growth in culture." I U.S. Congress, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY As-
sEssMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND
CELLS - SPECIAL REPORT 3 n.1 (1987) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
17. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (CL App. 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 793 P.2d 479 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S. CL 1388
(1991).
Cells are "the basic structure and functional units of all living organisms," and
carry within their nuclei an individual's unique genetic information in DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) macro molecules. DNA cloning is "the production of
billions of copies of a piece of DNA as part of a plasmid introduced into a
microorganisms .... " Technology [has] emerged allowing manipulations of
genetic material, or, as in the [Moore] case, utilized the genetic material of a
unique individual to produce substances of great benefit to humankind. The
process involves the joining together of segments of the DNA from the human
cells with those of a microorganism.. to create 'recombinant DNA.' This
process of genetic engineering, or gene splicing, produces a cell which divides,
and which, in the [Moore] case, produced cells 'shown to be capable of contin-
uous culture for an indefinite period of time.'
Id. at 498 n.3 (citation omitted).
Tissue and cell culturing is a technique essential for studying the complexity of the
human biological structure and the materials which comprise it. Culturing isolates cells
from the whole organism before examination. OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at S.
18. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. During each visit, blood and other bodily substances, in-
cluding blood serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate and sperm, were withdrawn from
Moore's body. Id.
19. See id. (noting that Golde represented to Moore that the tise sampling was "nec-
essary and required for his health and well-being").
20. Id. at 481-82.
21. The Use of Human Biological Materials in the Development of Biomedical Prod-
ucts: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm.
on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 268 (1985) (statement of John
Moore). The waiver form read as follows: "I (do, do not) voluntarily grant to the Univer-
sity of California any and all rights I, or my heirs, may have in any cell line or any
other potential product which might be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow
obtained from me." Id.
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were evasive.22 In 1984, the Mo-cell line was granted a patent
naming Golde and Quan as inventors and the Regents of the Uni-
versity of California as assignee.23 After receipt of the patent,
Golde negotiated agreements with two biotechnology firms for
commercial development of the Mo-cell line. 24 In addition to
making Golde a paid consultant, one of the firms offered Golde
"the rights to 75,000 shares of common stock."' Reports from
biotechnology industry periodicals have predicted a potential market
worth more than three billion dollars for Mo-cell line derivatives,
the profits from which Golde will likely share.26
The facts presented in the Moore case reveal several problems
that can arise when physicians not only provide therapeutic treat-
ment for their patients but also have economic interests in the
commercial value of the diagnostic specimens obtained from that
27treatment. Two key issues arise in this context: (1) whether or
not full disclosure of the potential conflict of interest between
patients' well-being and any potential financial gain to physicians
should be required as part of the informed consent process; and (2)
whether the fiduciary responsibility to protect patients' interests
requires complete disclosure by physicians of the prospect of their
economic gain.
The Moore case serves as a paradigm to illustrate these con-
flicts. 2 Because tissue is one of the key raw materials driving the
22. Id. at 254-55.
23. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482 (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032 (Mar. 20, 1984)).
24. Id.
25. Id. Golde obtained options to purchase 75,000 shares of stock of Genetics Institute,
one of the firms involved in commercial development of the Mo-cell line. Additionally,
Genetics Institute agreed to pay Golde and the Board of Regents "at least $330,000 over
three years, including a pro-rata share of [Golde's] salary and fringe benefits, in exchange
for ... exclusive access to the materials and research performed." Id. See also Sandra
Blakeslee, Patient's Right to Tissue is Limited, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1990, at C8, col. 4
("Golde negotiated an agreement with Genetics Institute Inc., a biotechnology firm in
Cambridge, Mass., to develop drugs from the cells ...Golde received 75,000 shares of
Genetics Institute stock for a penny each.").
26. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482. The Moore complaint cited published reports from indus-
try periodicals forecasting the range of uses for lymphokines, the overproduction of which
was a key characteristic of Mo-cell line. Id. at 482 & n.2.
27. See Deborah M. Levy, Biotech and the Breakdown of the Doctor-Patient Relation-
ship, MANHATTAN LAW., Feb. 7-13, 1989, at 12 (noting that the physician-patient rela-
tionship is compromised by a lack of information about the physician's research and
commercial activities).
28. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 93-111 (analyzing informed consent and dis-
closure in the context of physicians who treat patients and also conduct research).
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biotechnology industry, physicians who have the opportunity to
supply unique tissue samples, such as the Mo-cell line, have the
potential to realize significant economic gain. The conflict between
a patient's therapeutic best interests and a physician's economic
best interests surfaces where the physician discovers that the patient
has tissue with special characteristics. In these cases, the potential
for economic gain may impair that physician's objectivity regarding
proper treatment for the patient.
Yet the Moore case is considered an anomaly by the biotech-
nology industry; typically, the sources of a cell line are numerous
and difficult to trace.29 Most patients could not successfully iden-
tify their cells as the source of a particular cell line and would
never know to bring suit. Because the existence of a conflict of
interest normally remains hidden from most patients, it is necessary
that existing legal doctrines or new legislation protect patients'
interests. Patient protection becomes increasingly important as tech-
nology expands researchers' abilities to discover more information
from each sample of tissue, thereby creating an increased risk for
patients to be caught in a Moore-like situation.
II. THE PHYSICIAN AS A FIDUCIARY
The relationship between a doctor and a patient has often been
characterized as fiduciary in nature.3° The patient depends on the
physician for medical information and 'relies on him or her to be
truthful and candid.3' The fiduciary relationship between physician
and patient is interwoven with tenets of informed consent, such as
29. Levy, supra note 27, at 14 (quoting Dr. Larry Palmer, a professor at Cornell Law
School, who noted that the Moore court of appeal "[didn't] quite understand the econom-
ies of research"). See also OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 5 ("Establishing human cell
culture directly from human tissue is a relatively difficult enterprise and the probability of
establishing a cell line from a given sample varies, ranging from 0.01 percent for some
liver cells to nearly 100 percent for some human skin cells.").
30. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (finding that the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relation-
ship gives rise to a "'duty to reveal to the patient that which is in his best interests ...
[to] ... know.'" (quoting Emmett v. E. Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 935
(D.C. Cir. 1967)); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (requiring any defense
raised by a physician who has failed to disclose available choices and risks of particular
treatments to be consistent with the fiduciary qualities of the patient-physician relation-
ship).
31. See GEORGE J. ANNAS Er AL, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION:
TE SUBJEcT'S DILEMMA 30 (1977) (describing the fiduciary qualities of the doctor-patient
relationship).
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the patients' right to self-determination32 and promotion of indi-
vidual autonomy.33  Before further consideration of physicians'
fiduciary responsibilities with respect to patients' understanding of
their doctors' potential commercial interest in tissue, it is useful to
examine the role of the fiduciary in its basic legal form.
A. Basic Principles of Fiduciary Law
Fiduciary is defined alternately as "[a] person having [a] duty,
created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in
matters connected with such undertaking"' 4 or as "a person hold-
ing the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a
trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and the
scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires."35 Fiduciary
duties are implied into relationships where high degrees of trust are
required.36 The usual fiduciary relationships include that of trustee
and beneficiary, guardian and ward, agent and principal, attorney
and client, executor and legatees, directors and officers of a corpo-
ration and the corporation and its shareholders, partners and the
partnership itself, and doctor and patient.37 Thus, the concept of a
fiduciary relationship between parties touches many areas of the
law.
Rules governing the various forms of fiduciary relationships,
many of which have evolved over centuries, 38 share several identi-
32. See id. (noting that the right of self-determination entitles individuals to refuse
medical treatment for "any reason, no matter how silly or unsound it may seem to the
physician"). The issue of self-determination usually arises with respect to causation, where
the patient is attempting to prove that she would have declined the medical treatment
alleged to be the basis of her injury had the physician fully disclosed the nature of the
procedure. Id. at 31. Courts have been hesitant to adopt a subjective rule which asks
whether or not the particular patient involved in the suit would have refused treatment if
full disclosure had been made. Id. Instead, a more objective "'reasonable person' in the
patient's position" standard is used. Id.
33. See id. at 35. According to Annas, "[t]he purpose of autonomy is to protect the
individual's integrity as a person or 'human being' by denying anyone the right to invade
[her] body without [her] consent." Id Autonomy can be viewed as the right to privacy in
making decisions about one's own body or as the right to be left alone. Id. For further
discussion of individuals' autonomy, see infra text accompanying notes 129-38.
34. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).
35. Id.
36. See MERTON FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 295 n.49 (1954).
37. Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L REV. 539, 541 (1949).
38. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 795 (1983). The earliest
fiduciaries were trustees, bailees and administrators whose practices pre-date the Statute of
Uses of 1536. Id. While the concept of agency did not appear until the end of the eigh-
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fiable characteristics. Courts tend to design the rules governing
fiduciaries and the scope of their duties within the context of the
substantive areas of law in which the fiduciary relationship
occurs."9 Nonetheless, courts consistently look for the qualities of
trust, confidence, good faith and loyalty to define a relationship as
fiduciary.' One of the basic precepts of all fiduciary relationships
is the duty of loyalty.4 1 This duty requires the fiduciary to act
solely in the interest of the principal.42 The scope of a fiduciary's
duty of loyalty increases as the independent authority exercised by
the fiduciary increases.43
The term "entrustor" has been used by one commentator to
describe the role of the principal because it highlights the basic
dependence characteristic of fiduciary relationships." Dependence
by the principal on the fiduciary sets the relationship apart from
the typical arm's-length dealings that occur in the marketplace.
4
Because of the entrustors' dependence, situations will arise in
which fiduciaries can take advantage of their principals. Fur-
teenth century, fiduciary relationships as applied to partnerships and corporations appeared
with the initial formation of those entities as early as the seventeenth century. Id. (citing
Charles C. Allen, Agent and Servant Essentially Identica4 28 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 18 n.1
(1894); see also WILLIAM M. FLECHER, FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS, § I (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (outlining development of the corpo-
rate form in Europe and England up to the 10th century)). Physicians and psychiatrists
are considered recent additions to the fiduciary group. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (noting that the patient-
physician relationship is considered fiduciary in nature because it promotes full and free
disclosure of all information by the patient to the doctor); Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d
589, 591 (Wash. 1967) (the relationship of patient and physician is a fiduciary one, in-
volving every element of trust, confidence and good faith).
39. See Frankel, supra note 38, at 796 n.8 ("For example, the principles governing the
fiduciary duty of corporate directors are treated as part of corporate law.").
40. See Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role For Fiduciary Duties?, 53
U. CIN. L REV. 731, 740 (1984) ("Some relationships are so typically imbued with quali-
ties of trust, confidence and good faith that courts have been able comfortably to assume
that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a fiduciary relationship must exist.").
41. J.C. SHEPARD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIAMES, at 48 (1981). See also Earl R. Hoover,
Basic Principles Underlying Duty of Loyalty, 5 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 7 (1956) (describing
the basic nature and the extent of the duty of loyalty).
42. See Scott, supra note 37, at 540 (quoting JOsIAH ROYCE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LOYALTY 16 (1930) who defines loyalty as "'[t]he willing and practical and thorough-go-
ing devotion of a person to a cause ..."").
43. Id. at 541. "Thus, a trustee is under a stricter duty of loyalty than is an agent
upon whom limited authority is conferred or a corporate director who can act only as a
member of the board of directors or a promoter acting for investors in a new corpora-
tion." Id.
44. Frankel, supra note 38, at 800 n.17.
45. Scott, supra note 37, at 541.
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thermore, principals will frequently be unable to detect abuses of
trust, such as self-dealing and undue influence, because their fidu-
ciaries possesses superior knowledge.'
Self-dealing, perhaps the most blatant breach of fiduciary duty,
occurs when fiduciaries act without the consent of their principals
and where those actions serve to benefit the fiduciaries, them--
selves. 7 For example, a fiduciary entrusted with the sale of prop-
erty who buys the property herself4" or a fiduciary who sells his
own property to his principal engages in self-dealing. Self-deal-
ing is a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.5" The term self-
dealing is used because the fiduciary is positioned on both sides of
the transaction, representing personal interests on one side and the
interests of the principal on the other.5" Thus, interests of fiducia-
ry and principal are in direct conflict. In the case of the fiduciary
who buys her principal's property, the principal/seller wants to get
the highest sale price possible, while the fiduciary/buyer wants to
purchase the property for as little as possible.52 Fiduciaries, then,
cannot act opportunistically, because doing so invariably leads to
conflicts of interest.
53
46. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972) ('Patients ordinarily are persons unlearned in the medical scienc-
es . . . [and] it is only in the unusual case that a court could safely assume that the
patient's insights were on a parity with those of the treating physician.").
47. Scott, supra note 37, at 543.
48. Id. at 543-45.
49. Id. at 544-45.
50. Id. at 545.
51. Id.
52. The rules for real estate brokers, for example, are clear with respect to self-dealing.
A broker cannot, without the seller's informed consent, purchase the property, split a
commission or take a rebate from a buyer. D. BARLOW BURKE, JR. LAW OF REAL Es-
TATE BROKERS §§ 4.2-.3 (1982 and Supp. 1991). For example, in Wendt v. Fischer, 154
N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926), real estate brokers sold a particular piece of property to a
corporation in which one of the brokers served as president and manager. Judge Cardozo
said of the transaction:
As broker for the seller, the duty of this fiduciary was to make the terms as
favorable to his employer and the price as high as possible. As president and
manager of the buyer corporation, its sole representative in the transaction, his
duty was just the opposite.
Id.
53. Chaykin, supra note 40, at 742-43. A "fiduciary must not act opportunistically,
even if his actions would otherwise be regarded as fair competition in a normal business
setting.- Id.
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B. Fiduciary Law Applied to Physicians
Discovery of the hidden value in human tissue and cells has
been cited as a "signal [of] a further breakdown in the relationship
between doctors and patients and [the need for] a further extension
of the legal system to mend that breach."' On remand, John
Moore will have an opportunity to argue that Golde had an undis-
closed research interest in Moore's cells at the time he sought
Moore's consent to the splenectomy or to subsequent blood work-
ups.5 This undisclosed research interest would be an opportunistic
conflict of interest:
(1) a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to
the patient's health, whether research or economic, that
may affect the physician's professional judgment; and (2) a
physician's failure to disclose such interests may give rise
to a cause of action for performing medical procedures
without informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.
5 6
Thus, the Moore court defined physicians' obligations with respect
to their personal economic interests in terms of the fiduciary rela-
tionship between physicians and their patients.
A conflict of interest between fiduciary and principal need not
end the fiduciary relationship. Where a conflict exists, the fiduciary
may continue in that capacity if full disclosure of the'conflict is
made to the principal.57 Because trust lies at the heart of the fidu-
54. Levy, supra note 27, at 12. Dr. Gladys White, director of the 1987 Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment study on the ownership of human tissue and cells, has
speculated that "if the patient-doctor relationship [between John Moore and Golde] had not
been so compromised'by the information about the physician's research and commercial
activities, the conversion issue would not have been prominent" Id. at 14. See also OTA
REPORT, supra note 16, at 93-111 (discussing the adequacy of disclosure by a physician
regarding research and commercial activities).
55. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct 1388 (1991). For a discussion of why this argument will fail, see infra text
accompanying notes 92-126.
56. Id.
57. WML.AM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 170 at 311-12 (4th ed. 1987). For
example, an attorney whose interests conflict or potentially conflict with the interests of a
client can still represent the client if, after full disclosure of the nature of the conflict to
the client, informed consent is obtained. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILiTY DR 5-101(A) (1981), which states:
Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his
client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business,
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ciary relationship, anything less than full disclosure of a potentially
conflicting interest, especially an economic interest, is a breach of
the relationship. A fiduciary remains liable if the disclosure is
indefinite, equivocal or inadequate.58
The adequacy of disclosure in medical relationships must take
into account the physician's actual statement to a patient and the
patient's particular ability to comprehend.59 Though disclosure
requirements usually refer to the adequacy of information conveyed
about medical risks, the law also recognizes disclosure as being
applicable to a physician's personal interests.6° The Moore court
indicated that the economic interests of a physician are material to
property, or personal interests.
See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)(1) & (2) (1983), which
states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client
consents after consultation ....
58. See Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926) ("If dual interests are to be
served, the disclosure to be effective must lay bare the truth, without ambiguity or reser-
vation, in all its stark significance ... ." (citation omitted)).
59. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C, Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972). "mhe fact finding process on performance of the duty [to disclose]
reaches back to what the physician actually said, [and while the] adequacy of the reve-
lation will vary as between patients, . . . the fluctuations are attributable to the kind of
divulgence which may be reasonable under the [particular] circumstances." Id. See also
Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 946 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding that disclosure of alterna-
tive treatment means disclosure of alternatives for the particular patient, not a recital of
medical theory); Campbell v. Oliva, 424 F.2d 1244, 1251 (6th Cir. 1970) ("[E]ach patient
presents a separate problem, . ..the patient's mental and emotional condition is important
and in certain cases may be crucial, and ... in discussing the elements of risk a certain
amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure necessary for
an informed consent." (quoting Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem. Works, 381 S.W.2d 563, 567
(Tenn. CL App. 1964))).
60. See, e.g., Magan Medical Clinic v. California State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 57
Cal. Rptr. 256, 262 (Ct. App. 1967) ("Certainly a sick patient deserves to be free of any
reasonable suspicion that his doctor's judgment is influenced by a profit motive.").
The Moore Court noted that a physician must disclose all facts that are material to
a patient's decision about treatment. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d
479, 485 n.10 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. CL 1388 (1991). It is important to distin-
guish physicians' obligations with respect to patients' medical needs from patients' other
interests. The Moore court was concerned not with protecting patients' financial interests,
but rather with certain personal interests of physicians which, if not disclosed, could affect
the physicians' professional judgments. Id. Whether or not a physician has a duty to
disclose a personal interest depends on the materiality of that interest to the doctor's rec-
ommendation of a particular medical procedure. Id. at 485 n.9.
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a patient's treatment decision." Furthermore, a physician has an
affirmative duty to make adequate disclosure of all information
material to a patient's decision prior to commencing treatment.62
It is the fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient that
imposes upon the doctor the obligation to disclose to the patient all
material facts necessary for the patient to make an informed deci-
sion.63 As in other fiduciary relationships, the physician as fidu-
ciary cannot profit from the relationship absent full disclosure even
if the patient also benefits from the course of treatment pre-
scribed."
III. THE Do=DN OF INFORMED CONSENT
The doctrine of informed consent is a product of tort law65
stemming from the fundamental principle "volenti non fit injuria -
to one who is willing, no wrong is done."6 In the context of the
doctor-patient relationship, the doctrine can be defined as a
physician's duty to inform a patient of the risks, expected results,
potential but unexpected results and potential complications of the
proposed medical treatment.67 Informed consent is necessary in
order to assist the patient in deciding whether to undergo or refuse
medical treatment.68
61. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
62. OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 98 (discussing timing of disclosure necessary for
informed consent). According to Annas, a breach of a physician's duty to disclose occurs
when any of the specific disclosure requirements adopted in a particular jurisdiction are
not followed. ANNAS et al., supra note 31, at 30. For a sample disclosure checklist a
physician might use, see infra note 73.
63. Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236, 239 n.7 (10th Cir. 1979) ('The duty of the doctor
to inform the patient is in the nature of a fiduciary duty .... "); Roebuck v. Steuart,
544 A.2d 808, 821 (Md. App. 1988).
64. Id.
65. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTs, 818 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (explaining the significance of the broad con-
cept of "consent" in tort law).
66. Id. at 112.
67. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976) (defin-
ing informed consent as "the giving of information to the patient as to just what would
be done and as to its consequences"); Ladonna L. Griffith, Comment, Informed Consent:
Patient's Right to Comprehend, 27 HOW. L.L 975, 975 (1984).
68. See Griffith, supra note 67, at 976 (quoting Judge Cardozo's dictum "[e]very hu-
man being of adult years and [sic] mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body ... " in Scholoendoff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93
(N.Y. 1914)).
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A. Traditional Informed Consent Doctrine
In Canterbury v. Spence,69 the court noted that "[t]he average
patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordi-
narily has only his physician to whom he can look for enlighten-
ment with which to reach an intelligent decision."7° This charac-
terization is consistent with basic tenets of fiduciary law, such as
the principal's dependence on the fiduciary and the disparity of
special knowledge between the parties.7" The doctrine of informed
consent reflects concerns other than fiduciary obligations as well.
Informed consent refers to legal rules that prescribe behav-
iors for physicians in their interactions with patients and
provide for penalties, under given circumstances, if physi-
cians deviate from those expectations; to an ethical doc-
trine, rooted in our society's cherished value of autonomy,
that insures to patients their right of self-determination
when medical decisions need to be made; and to an inter-
personal process whereby physicians . . . interact with pa-
tients to select an appropriate course of medical care.72
The doctrine of informed consent has traditionally been applied
to protect patients from risky medical procedures that may result in
physical injuries.73 Consistent with that purpose, the law generally
69. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
70. Id. at 780.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46. Relationships that stem from specializa-
tion, such as the physician-patient relationship, "are often classified as fiduciary because
they pose the problem of abuse of power that is common to fiduciary relations." Frankel,
supra note 38, at 804. Where specialization characterizes the relationship, the superior
knowledge of the fiduciary justifies disclosure requirements. See id. at 803. There is an
inherent risk that the power a fiduciary derives from expertise will be misused to the
injury or detriment of the principal. Id. at 809.
72. PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 3 (1987).
73. Informed consent requires disclosure by a physician of the nature of a medical
treatment according to prevailing standards of practice. Mary T. Danforth, Cells, Sales,
and Royalties: The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
179, 182 n.11 (1988). The standard for disclosure varies according to jurisdiction, but
usually falis into one of three categories: (1) customary practice in the area; (2) a reason-
able physician standard; or (3) a standard which asks "what the reasonable patient would
need to know to make an intelligent choice." Id. (citing Raymond D. Cotton & Andrew
L. Sandier, The Regulation of Organ Procurement and Transplantation in the United
States, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 55, 73-74 (1986)). See also FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO
TREATMENT A PRACTICAL GUIDE 9 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the elements of a traditional
negligence-based claim for lack of informed consent). See generally infra text accompany-
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denies "recovery for inadequate disclosure in the absence of bodily
harm."74 Where a lack of informed consent is alleged, a patient
must demonstrate that the insufficiency of information was the
effective cause of his or her harm. In other words, the patient must
prove that the treatment undertaken would have been refused had
the patient known of risks not disclosed. An objective standard
applies to test this element of causation; the patient-plaintiff must
prove that a reasonable person in the patient's position would have
withheld consent to treatment if all material risks had been dis-
closed.7' Furthermore, the patient may recover damages only if
the resultant bodily harm is "one the risk of which was not ex-
plained or known to the patient prior to the [defendant-,doctor's]
medical intervention."
76
The paradigm presented by Moore offers a unique twist in
applying informed consent analysis. Under traditional analysis,
Moore's claim for lack of informed consent will fail notwithstand-
ing nondisclosure of the commercial use of Moore's tissue unless
Moore can also demonstrate that a reasonable patient would have
refused treatment, i.e., the splenectomy, had he had known of the
research project.77 As a practical matter, Moore will be unable to
satisfy that burden because removal of Moore's spleen was instru-
mental in saving his life.7 Nevertheless, two key questions re-
ing notes 146-52 (describing disclosure standards from the physicians' ethical point of
view).
A disclosure checklist for most physicians might include: "1. A description of the
proposed treatment; 2. Alternatives to the proposed treatment; 3. Inherent risks of death or
serious bodily injury in the proposed treatment; 4. Problems of recuperation that are antic-
ipated; and 5. Any additional information other physicians would disclose in similar cir-
cumstances." ANNAS et al., supra note 31, at 30.
74. Alan Meisel, A 'Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge between the Idea of Informed Con-
sent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 L MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 211 (1988).
75. See, e.g., Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1025 (Md. 1977) (adopting objective over
subjective test); Gerald F. Tietz, Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context: The
Special Case, 61 WASH. L. REV. 367, 374 (1986). But see Alexander M. Capron, In-
formed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
340, 420 (1974) (arguing that a subjective standard is necessary to achieve "the funda-
mental purpose of the informed consent rule, the promotion of individual autonomy").
76. Meisel, supra note 74, at 211.
77. Based on negligence concepts, a patient alleging lack of informed consent must,
under a traditional analysis, prove (1) the appropriate standard of disclosure; (2) that a
breach of that standard took place; (3) that as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
this breach, the patient was harmed; and (4) that had the patient been properly informed,
consent to the procedure would have been withheld. OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 94.
78. Spleen Rights, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 11, 1990, at 30, 31 (noting that damages for
lack of informed consent in Moore could be low because removal of Moore's spleen
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main: to what did Moore consent and in what capacity did Golde
act, physician or researcher?
The Moore case addresses indirectly the issue of whether a
patient must specifically consent to a physician using tissue re-
moved from the patient's body for commercial purposes. Yet, the
facts do not lend themselves to traditional informed consent analy-
sis because the disclosure owed to Moore from his physician per-
tained to a conflict of interest regarding potential profits, not risk
of bodily harm. When Golde continued to take blood samples from
Moore not for a medical purpose beneficial to Moore but rather for
Golde's research, Moore ceased being a patient in the therapeutic
sense and become more like a research subject.79
The hybrid situation typified by Moore, where a physician
treats a patient and simultaneously uses the related diagnostic spec-
imens for research, defies traditional informed consent analysis. 0
Was Moore consenting as a patient to medical treatment, was
Moore consenting to be the subject of research or was Moore
consenting to the use of his tissue as the subject matter of re-
search? Apparently, Moore himself became similarly confused
about his status with respect to Golde's work and refused to sign
consent forms offered at the time of later visits to the Medical
Center without complete answers to questions about his role in
Golde's work.8'
B. Informed Consent to Human Research
With respect to medical treatment, the doctrine of informed
consent focuses on adequate disclosure of the risks and benefits of
proposed medical procedure. In comparison, disclosure requirements
with respect to medical research aim at ensuring that subjects un-
derstand the nature of the studies, the level of involvement required
of them and any risks involved. 2
After World War H1, human research became a topic of serious
discussion world-wide.8 3 This elevated level of interest led to the
"did, after all, help to cure [him] of leukemia").
79. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
80. See Danforth, supra note 73, at 184 (contending that Moore's case would "fail
under traditional informed consent doctrine").
81. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
82. See OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 100, 102 (describing the need for a detailed
disclosure of risk information in the research setting).
83. Id. at 94.
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creation of a myriad of guidelines, statutes and regulations to over-
see those conducting human research." Regulations governing
medical research incorporate notions of informed consent. "Both
statutory law and related administrative regulations define informed
consent as a primary independent principle for the regulation of
research on human subjects."85 However, informed consent in the
research context differs from informed consent in the treatment
context. The statutory and administrative definitions of informed
consent for research have moved away from the tort-based concept
of informed consent for medical treatment. Instead of focusing on
the personal liability of physicians and on redressing harmis already
done, the law governing human research is designed to prevent
harm to research subjects.86
In this country, federal regulations have been promulgated to
protect human subjects participating in federally-sponsored research.
The agencies primarily responsible for these regulations are the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)s and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA).88 The HHS regulations are "rec-
ognized as being the primary Federal requirements governing the
protection of human research subjects."89 The HHS regulations ad-
dress explicitly the general requirements for informed consent,
reflecting regulators' concern that any undue influence or coercion
of the subject be minimized, and specify when waiver is permissi-
84. Id See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
85. BERNARD BARBER, INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL THERAPY AND RESEARCH 41
(1980). Informed consent is considered a relatively new development in this area of pa-
tient/subject - doctor/researcher interaction. In the late 1960's, a long-time observer of
developments affecting law and medicine offered this commentary:
In the years prior to the current decade [the 1960's], there was little 'law" in
the United States concerning medical research. There were no specific federal
or state statutes purporting to regulate research organizations or investigators in
their research methods, their areas of research, or the use of subjects or pa-
tients in such work. There were also no reported court actions involving liabili-
ty issues of criminal actions against research organizations or personnel.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Professor William Curran of the Harvard Medical School).
86. Id. at 44 (quoting Curran).
87. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124 (1990) (governing research conducted or funded by HHS,
which includes the National Institutes of Health).
88. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-.48 (1991) (governing clinical investigations to support applica-
tions for research or marketing permits for products including drugs, food additives, bio-
logical products and medical devices).
89. OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 94 ("The Interagency Human Subjects Coordinat-
ing Committee, which has representatives of 17 Federal agencies, has proposed that the
DHHS regulations serve as a model policy for all Federal departments and agen-
cies ....").
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ble and under what circumstances verbal consent can be accept-
ed. 90
The objectives of these regulations serve the valuable purpose
of protecting human research subjects. However, these regulations,
even when properly executed, reach only those research programs
subject to federal regulation.9' In Moore, these regulations did not
appertain.
92
IV. MOORE REVISITED
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
As previously discussed, the physician-patient relationship is a
fiduciary one; physicians owe a special duty of care to patients not
to act in any way contrary to patients' best interests or in any way
that would jeopardize patients' rights or welfare.93 Physicians'
fiduciary obligations have been construed to pertain not only to
protection of patients from physical harm, but to protection of
patients from any conflict of interest that might impair the
physicians' ability to provide optimal treatment.' In \Moore,
Golde's judgment was conflicted by the inherent tension between
90. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116-.117. The relevant sections provide:
Except as provided elsewhere in this or other subparts, no investigator may in-
volve a human being as a subject in research covered by these regulations un-
less the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the
subject or the subject's legally authorized representative. An investigator shall
seek such consent only under circumstances that provide the prospective subject
or the representative sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to partici-
pate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence ....
Id. § 46.116. The regulations continue:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) . . . informed consent shall be docu-
mented by the use of a written consent form ...
(b) [specifies the written consent form requirements]
(c) An IRB [Institutional Review Board] may waive the requirement for ... a
signed consent form for some or all subjects if it finds either:
(1) . .. mhe principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach
of confidentiality . . . [or]
(2) That the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects
and involves no procedures for which written consent is normally required
outside of the research context.
Id. § 46.117.
91. See id. § 46.101. See also supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 123-25.
93. See supra text accompanying note 52.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
[Vol. 42:565
ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN PATIENTS CELLS
treating Moore for the sake of Moore's health under the auspices
of continued therapy and treating Moore for the sake of medical
research driven by the unique character of Moore's tissue and its
potential to yield results having substantial commercial value.
In a therapeutic setting, "the physician may have more influ-
ence over his patient . . ." than a physician would have in a strict-
ly nontherapeutic, experimental setting." Therefore, a physician
treating a potential research subject may be ideally situated to
exercise undue influence to coax or even coerce the patient to
participate in research. The prospect of commercial gain provides a
motive which could lure a physician to compromise a patient's
therapeutic needs in favor of using the patient as an "invaluable
source of scientific knowledge .... "'
1. Physicians' Liability
If Moore brings a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty,
his claim will be tested against the traditional rules guiding the
rights and obligations of each party in a fiduciary relationship.
Moore will have to prove that Golde's breach - his failure to
disclose the conflict of interest - was the proximate cause of
some harm to him.' Under traditional principles of fiduciary law,
Moore could argue that Golde, as fiduciary, secured a benefit for
himself at a cost to Moore, his principal, and that Golde therefore
violated the basic duty of loyalty owed by fiduciary to principal
when he failed to disclose his own interest.9" But, the Moore
court framed the conflict of interest issue to reflect a concern for
patients' physical well-being rather than for patients' financial inter-
est in the raw materials supplied to physician/researchers.
95. ANNAS et al., supra note 31, at 54. See also OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 97
(The danger of undue influence is as real in the research setting as it is in the medical
treatment context.").
96. OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 97. The OTA Report also notes that commercial
gain is not the only motivation for undue influence used by physician/researchers.
For some, the potential for public or scientific recognition may be more of an
impetus to unduly influence subjects than the thought of reaping financial re-
ward. While it may be difficult to discern public or peer recognition as a cause
for concern, the potential exists for the physician/researcher to conduct him-
self/herself in a manner that unduly influences the subject.
Id.
97. See, e.g., Roebuck v. Stewart, 544 A.2d 808, 821 (Md. App. 1988) (holding that a
lawyer breached his fiduciary duty by not revealing a conflict of interest which was the
proximate cause of a damage award against the lawyer's client).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 40-53.
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So long as a physician discloses research and economic
interests that may affect his judgment, the patient is pro-
tected from conflicts of interest. Aware of any conflicts, the
patient can make an informed decision to consent to treat-
ment, or to withhold consent and look elsewhere for medi-
cal assistance."
Thus, even if Moore clears one hurdle by proving Golde failed to
disclose a conflict of interest, he faces yet another obstacle in
proving that failure to disclose the conflict caused the type of
injury intended to be prevented by traditional disclosure require-
ments between physicians and patients.0"
2. Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty"0'
The question remains as to what damages Moore would be
entitled to receive if he were to prove Golde's liability for breach
of fiduciary duty. Moore may have incurred unnecessary expenses
in travelling between Seattle and Los Angeles. Therefore, Moore's
visits for blood work-ups may be compensable if lack of full dis-
closure regarding their purpose was the proximate cause of Moore
spending time and money to make these trips. In contrast, it is
unlikely Moore can successfully argue that he would have refused
the initial life-saving operation to remove his spleen. In other
words, even if Golde's financial interest in Moore's spleen created
a conflict of interest that should have been disclosed, the conflict
was not the proximate cause of any harm to Moore. While full
disclosure of Golde's potential economic interest may have led him
to choose another physician, Moore would have undergone the
splenectomy in any event."° Because Moore was not really
harmed by the loss of his spleen, he could claim no damages aris-
99. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). The Moore court reasoned that "enforcement of physicians'
disclosure obligations protects patients directly, without hindering the socially useful activi-
ties of innocent researchers." Id. at 497.
100. See id. at 496-97.
101. It is not the purpose of this note to discuss damages in detail, but rather to raise
the reader's awareness that the causes of action "available" to Moore in light of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's opinion would either be impossible to prove based on the existing
legal theory or inadequate.
102. Gold may also argue that there was no conflict to disclose at the time of the
splenectomy because Golde was unaware of the potential commercial value of Moore's
tissue until after surgery had been performed. This argument would not be true with re-
spect to subsequent blood work-ups requested by Golde.
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ing from that particular procedure in his treatment.
As a result, Moore's damages for breach of fiduciary duty
would probably be nominal, limited to harm he experienced after
removal of his spleen.
B. Lack of Informed Consent
1. Traditional Informed Consent to Medical Treatment
As discussed above, a cause of action for lack of informed
consent is tested against an objective standard asking whether a
reasonable patient would have undergone a particular procedure had
the patient known of the undisclosed risk realized in the plaintiff's
case."°  The traditional informed consent claim was not designed
to accommodate the situation illustrated in Moore - commercial-
ization of a patient's tissue and organs without the patient's con-
sent."4
The elements of a claim for monetary damages based on lack
of informed consent vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. General-
ly, these criteria address such issues as the standard of conduct
required of the physician, 5 the standard of causation'06 and the
necessity of expert testimony." These rules of recovery guide
the litigation process in suits brought by patients seeking damages
from physicians who have allegedly violated their duty to obtain
informed consent."°a
103. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
105. The standard typically imposed is "one of 'good medical practice,' which is to say,
what is customary and usual in the profession." KEETON et al., supra note 65, at 189.
This legal standard gives the medical community the ability to establish customary con-
duct in the profession by merely adopting its own usual practice. Id.
106. Two standards of causation in informed consent cases have emerged. APPELBAUM
et al., supra note 72, at 119. Decision-causation exists when it "can be said that if the
physician had made proper disclosure, a decision would have been made to decline
treatment. . . ." Id. at 121. Injury-causation exists if the patient can show "that the
medical procedure performed by the defendant [physician] led to the injury. This require-
ment is merely a specific instance of the general one in negligence cases that the plaintiff
prove cause-in-fact . . . ." Id. at 119-20.
107. Most jurisdictions require that testimony of an expert witness be presented to assist
the jury in understanding the questions of medical science and technique it will consider
in reaching its verdict. KEETN et al., supra note 65, at 188. Expert testimony is used to
establish the standard of care and the fact that a physician's conduct in any particular
case did not measure up to the applicable standard. Id.
108. APPELBAUM et al., supra note 72, at 15. According to Appelbaum and his co-au-
thors,
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Causes of action for violation of the informed consent doctrine
have been prosecuted in two forms: as intentional tort sounding in
battery or as professional negligence.' e Battery occurs when a
person engages in intentional conduct resulting in an offensive, but
not necessarily harmful, touching of another person.1 Contact is
considered offensive if it occurs without consent."' Therefore, a
physician commits a battery if he or she fails to obtain proper
consent to any procedure involving touching.1 12 Negligence, on
the other hand, requires the injured party to meet more rigorous
criteria to establish physician liability. A patient alleging negligence
must first establish that the physician failed to use reasonable care
to prevent harm to the patient. Then the patient must prove that
the physician's failure to act with reasonable care was the proxi-
mate cause of some injury."3 The distinction between the two
theories for informed consent liability has been described as fol-
lows:
If lack of informed consent is remediable as a battery
rather than negligence, a patient has a right to recover
damages for inadequate disclosure alone, even if not physi-
cally injured by the physician's treatment. The wrong to
the patient is the deprivation of a right of personal choice
based upon adequate information, sometimes called a digni-
tary harm. In contrast, with negligence theory the right
vindicated is the right to be free from bodily injury caused
by substandard medical practice. If the negligence causes
no bodily injury to the patient, no remediable wrong is
considered to have occurred.
114
The problem Moore faces in asserting a violation of informed
[the rules of recovery] are largely technical issues, most of which should have
only indirect (though not necessarily insubstantial) effect on the manner in
which physicians seek to comply with their duties to inform patients and obtain
their consent. [The rules] deal, in effect, not with the right to informed consent,
but with the remedy for the violation of that right.
Id.
109. Id. at 116.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18.
111. See id. § 18 cmt. c.
112. APPELBAUM et al., supra note 72, at 114.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76. See also APPELBAUM et al., supra note
72, at 115 (describing the negligence theory of a physician's failure to obtain informed
consent).
114. APPELBAUM et al., supra note 72, at 117.
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consent centers on this distinction. Courts have tended to overlook
the battery action in favor of the professional negligence theo-
ry.115 The general unwillingness of courts to invoke the rules of
battery means that without some showing of physical harm, Moore
has no viable claim for damages." 6 As already noted, the argu-
ment that Moore was harmed is quite tenuous because the splenec-
tomy performed by Golde saved Moore's life." 7
As an alternative to the battery theory, Moore could sue Golde
for inadequate disclosure of the true nature of his post-surgery
therapy under other torts that recognize a patient's dignitary rights.
These possible actions include intentional infliction of emotional
distress,"' negligent infliction of emotional distress"' and inva-
115. Meisel, supra note 74, at 211. Meisel argues that continued denial of legal pro-
tection to a patient whose doctor inadequately discloses information is a serious and fun-
damental failure of the law of informed consent. Id.
116. The cause of action for inadequate disclosure of information to a patient based on
a theory of battery has not gone completely unrecognized by courts. Ironically, however,
the state that allows this action in theory has also denied recovery to patients asserting it.
See Boyer v. Smith, 497 A.2d 646, 649 (Pa. Super. CL 1985) (limiting application to
those cases involving surgical or operative procedures); Malloy v. Shanahan, 421 A.2d
803, 804 (Pa. Super. CL 1980) (holding that administration of oral medication does not
qualify as a technical assault in the absence of consent due to lack of requisite "touch-
ing").
Battery is still a recognized cause of action where therapy is administered without
any consent or outside the scope of the consent given. APPELBAUM et al., supra note 72,
at 118.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
118. The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) intent to cause
emotional distress; (2) outrageous conduct by the defendant; and (3) severe emotional dis-
tress suffered by the plaintiff. Meisel, supra note 72, at 212. One commentator cites judi-
cial fears of fraudulent lawsuits and a landslide of litigation to explain the judiciary's
initial reluctance to award damages based on a claim of emotional distress. Id. The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, § 46, includes bodily harm as an element of the emotional
distress cause of action. Although some courts still require bodily injury as an element of
emotional distress claims, this requirement "seems gradually to be fading." Meisel, supra
note 73, at 212; see also KEETON et al., supra note 65, § 54.
119. Courts remain reluctant to recognize this cause of action. KEETON et al., supra
note 65, § 54. However, a notable breakthrough in the physician-patient context came
with Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). In Molien, a physi-
cian incorrectly diagnosed Mrs. Molien as having syphilis and advised her to inform her
husband so that he could be tested for the disease. i at 814. Mrs. Molien was treated
for the purported infection. Id. Tests performed on Mr. Molien showed he was not infect-
ed. Id. Because of the misinformation supplied by the physician, the Moliens' relationship
deteriorated and they eventually separated. Id at 814-15. Mr. Molien sued the physician
for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. Id. at 814. The court
held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action in negligence even though the plaintiff-
husband suffered no physical harm. Id
Significantly, the doctor in Molien actually said something which the court consid-
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sion of privacy.12° Each of these causes of action will present
different problems in practice, but they all highlight the same
weakness in the law of informed consent: a patient must proceed
outside traditional law to obtain recovery for a wrongful act by a
physician.12 ' As one commentator notes, however, the expansion
of these alternative approaches to patient recovery in the absence
of bodily harm demonstrates courts' concern with protecting
patients' dignitary interests.' 2 Nevertheless, the scramble for oth-
er theories to redress nonphysical harms indicates the failure of
traditional informed consent doctrine to adequately protect the
interests of those patients faced with new problems that are the by-
products of an expanding technology.
2. Informed Consent to Participate in Research
Despite the existence of federal regulations pertaining to re-
search involving human subjects," 3 those rules do not resolve the
issues raised in Moore with respect to physicians who treat patients
and conduct research. First, these regulations apply only to research
involving human subject matter which is conducted or funded by
the federal government. 24 Second, the regulations exempt many
types of research involving human subjects, including research on
ered would be very upsetting to most patients and their spouses. Id. at 817. In constrast,
where lack of informed consent is alleged, a physician has failed to say something a
reasonable person would consider relevant to the decision to undergo a particular proce-
dure.
[W]hether or not the kind of affront to dignity that results when a doctor with-
holds relevant information from a patient is more closely akin to intentional
infliction or negligent infliction is a difficult question. . . . Perhaps the best
way of handling the failure to disclose as an infliction of emotional distress is
to treat the cause of action as a hybrid of negligence and intentional tort ....
Meisel, supra note 74, at 213.
120. See Meisel, supra note 74, at 213. Meisel notes that "[t]he right to privacy -
when viewed as a right to be let alone - is a more straightforward approach for pro-
tecting the interests which the law of informed consent does and should protect than
battery or infliction of emotional distress." Id. As between battery and negligence, howev-
er, the theory of recovery preferred by the courts, negligence, fails completely to protect a
patient's right to be let alone, the very human dignity which is demeaned by inadequate
disclosure. Id. at 214.
121. See id. at 211-12 (stating that the law of battery has historically been the remedy
for offensive physical contact which does not result in bodily harm, but courts have been
reticent to apply those standards to the doctor-patient relationship).
122. Id.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
124. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101. The research must be linked to HHS by direct financial sup-
port or through staffing with government employees. Id. § 46.101(a).
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diagnostic specimens."
Even if the research was subject to federal regulation, it is
likely Moore's spleen would have been considered a diagnostic
specimen exempt from federal controls. Thus, because the facts of
Moore do not seem to fit within the province of the regulations,
the regulatory informed consent provisions protecting research sub-
jects would be unhelpful to Moore's cause.
Only a few states have enacted similar statutes regulating hu-
man research; those that have acted exempt from state regulation
research subject to federal rules. ' While numerous state statutes
address the traditional view of informed consent, none specifically
addresses a physician's obligation to disclose commercial interests
in patients' tissues. 27 In 1987, a report issued by the congressio-
nal Office of Technology Assessment speculated that the lack of
125. Id. § 46.101(b)(5).
Research activities in which the only involvement of human subjects will be in
one or more of the following categories are exempt from these regulations ...
(r]esearch involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records,
pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are made
publicly available or if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a
manner that the subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers
linked to the subjects.
Id.
126. See CAL. HEALTI & SAFETY CODE §§ 24,170-79.5 (West 1990) (Protection of Hu-
man Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act).
This chapter shall not apply to any person who is conducting a medical ex-
periment as an investigator within an institution which holds an assurance with
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare pursuant to Part 46 of Title
45 of the Code of Federal Regulations and who obtains informed consent in
the method and manner required by such regulations.
Id. § 24,178. See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2440-46 (McKinney 1985) (Protection
of Human Subjects).
The provisions of this article shall not apply to the conduct of human research
which is subject to, and which is in compliance with, policies and regulations
promulgated by any agency of the federal government for the protection of
human subjects.
Id. § 2445.
127. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-121 (1989). The Colorado statute provides for
patient grievance mechanisms in state licensed institutions that require appointment of
patient representatives and posting of the institution's policy statement in a conspicuous
place. The policy statement must include language stating that every physician has an
obligation to provide their patients with information regarding research, experimental or
educational projects relating to that particular patient's case.
The Colorado statute illustrates states' awareness that some physicians both treat pa-
tients and conduct research or experimentation. However, regulations like Colorado's are
still inadequate because the requirement that doctors disclose the existence of a research
project does not mean they will disclose their potential commercial gains.
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state regulation in this area of the law "may reflect a belief that
the states are not equipped to regulate or monitor human re-
search . . [or] that state legislators do not believe the subject is
so pressing as to require legislative initiatives."
128
V. PROPOSAL
Common law recovery for breach of fiduciary duty or lack of
informed consent is simply inadequate for patients whose rights to
full disclosure of physicians' commercial interests in their tissues
have been violated. Patients need some other form of protection for
these interests. A clear signal must be sent to physicians regarding
the extent of their duty to disclose economic interests in tissues
removed from patients under their medical care.
A. The Case for Disclosing Commercial Gain
Should physicians be required to disclose prospects of commer-
cial gain to their patients? If so, how much information must be
disclosed? Arguments can be made on both sides of the disclosure
issue.
The argument in favor of disclosure requirements with respect
to commercial interests stems largely from the concept of patients'
right to self-determination, a fundamental idea which permeates the
doctrine of informed consent at many levels.129 This argument
holds that a patient should be able to make an informed and in-
telligent decision regarding medical treatment.13° Professors Katz
and Capron argue that informed consent to medical intervention
performs six distinct functions:
1. To promote individual autonomy;
2. To protect the patient-subject's status as a human being;
3. To avoid fraud and duress;
4. To encourage self-scrutiny by the physician-investigator;
5. To encourage rational decisionmaking; and
6. To involve the public.
1 3
'
128. OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 95.
129. See SHEiLA McCLEAN & GERRY MAHER, MEDICINE, MORALS AND THE LAW 79
(1983) ("Traditionally [consent] is deemed to be a means of protecting the right to self-
determination which it is held all people have."). See also supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text.
130. Capron, supra note 75, at 364.
131. ANNAS et al., supra note 31, at 33 (condensing the point headings of JAY KATZ &
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Numbers one through three essentially restate the same proposition
- a patient has a right to individual autonomy which protects his
or her body from invasion without consent." 2 Numbers four and
five address the concept of rational decisionmaking from both sides
of the doctor-patient relationship.1 13 Finally, number six describes
the role consent plays with regard to a physician's reputation and
society's awareness of human research.1" Thus, the primary func-
tions of informed consent from a moral standpoint are to protect
the patient's individual autonomy, to promote rational
decisionmaking by both parties and to encourage public aware-
ness.
135
In the context of the Moore paradigm, these considerations
support the position that patients have a right to full disclosure of
physicians' commercial interests in their tissue and cells. Both the
right to individual autonomy and the need for rational
decisionmaking require that all material information regarding med-
ical intervention be disclosed to the patient before consent is given
for treatment. Some patients may have strong opinions regarding
particular types of research or commercialization of their tissues
that would lead them to forego treatment if such information were
disclosed. Alternatively, patients may choose to have the procedure
performed by another physician who does not have an economic
interest related to research with diagnostic specimens from the
patient.
Once a patient receives full disclosure about a physician's
potential commercial gain and consents to treatment despite the
conflict, the patient would not be entitled to share in profits result-
ing from the research. In other words, patients would not be al-
lowed to bargain for a share of potential profits in exchange for
their consent to medical treatment. The purpose of disclosure is to
preserve patients' right to make informed and rational decisions re-
ALEXANDER M. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASE: WHO DECreES WHAT? 82-90 (1975)).
132. Id. at 33-34. For additional information describing a person's right to individual
autonomy, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
133. ANNAS et al., supra note 31, at 34.
134. Capron, supra note 75, at 376. Capron notes that obtaining consent can either
enhance a physician's reputation for treating patients with equity and fairness or harm the
physician's reputation by labelling the doctor as using patients "as guinea pigs for [medi-
cal] studies or . . . innovations . . . ." Id. at 376 n.86.
135. See ANNAS et al., supra note 31, at 33-34. Annas comments, however, that the
public awareness "function" of informed consent is really just a "potential byproduct,
rather than a function." Id. at 33.
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garding treatment, not to encourage speculation by patients and
physicians about the profitability of particular medical proce-
dures.'36 Furthermore, removing the prospect of financial reward
for the patient helps to ensure that the patient's judgment will not
be clouded and that his or her ability -to examine and assess the
medical risks of the proposed treatment will not be impaired.
The Moore court essentially eliminated patients' ability to se-
cure a stake in a "highly theoretical windfall" under existing causes
of action by refusing to recognize property rights in patients' tis-
sue.137 It directed parties interested in pursuing the issue to the
legislature.
If the scientific users of human cells are to be held liable
for failing to investigate the consensual pedigree of their
raw materials, we believe the Legislature should make that
decision. Complex policy choices affecting all society are
involved and "[ilegislatures, in making such policy deci-
sions, have the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit
the advice of experts, and hold hearings at which all inter-
ested parties present evidence and express their
views .... 38
Generally, physicians do not have an absolute duty to inform
patients of any and all risks and resultant consequences of a medi-
cal intervention. 39 Rather, physicians must not "deviate[] from
what expert testimony [shows] to be the established, acceptable
medical practice on disclosure in the community."' 40 Alternative-
ly, some courts state the physician's duty to patients as requiring
disclosure of "all material facts which reasonably should be known
if his patient is to make an informed and intelligent decision."' 4'
136. Recall that financial gain attributable to tissue from a single individual is extremely
unusual. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Thus, undertaking treatment with an
eye toward financial reward would be a highly speculative venture.
137. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 496 (Cal. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
138. Id. (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 397 n.31 (Cal. 1988)).
139. Capron, supra note 75, at 404.
140. Id. at 404-05. See also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
141. Hunter v. Brown, 484 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd en banc, 502
P.2d 1194 (Wash. 1972).
Certain types of information are generally recognized as not being subject to the
disclosure requirement:
-risks already known to the patient,
-obvious risks which the patient may be presumed to know,
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Physicians argue that if they were to disclose potential com-
mercial gain to a patient in need of medical intervention, that
disclosure would detract from the more important medical aspects
of the proposed treatment" and could hamper the patient's "abil-
ity to reach an informed choice free of undue influence." 143 In
addition, some physicians argue that patients will distort their med-
ical histories, either by inclusion or omission, to qualify for a
particular study.1" These arguments reflect concern for the
patient's ability to handle information regarding commercialization
of their tissue.
Physicians and researchers also assert that they are not quali-
fied to estimate the potential commercial value of a particular
diagnostic specimen. Because the prospect of commercial gain is
often highly speculative, the value of a particular patient's contri-
bution to a particular research project would be impossible to con-
vey at the time of disclosure with any quantifiable accuracy. 4 In
light of these arguments, physicians would likely conclude that dis-
closure of commercial gain should not be required under either the
informed consent doctrine or principles governing fiduciary rela-
tionships.
Despite physicians' arguments against disclosure, patients'
rights to individual autonomy and self-determination must prevail.
Physicians should not have unlimited discretion to decide what to
disclose. "Unlimited discretion in the physician is irreconcilable
with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate informed
decision ... ."4 While participation in medical experimentation
and research, which generally seeks to benefit all humankind,
should be encouraged, 47 the drive for medical advances should
not be made at the expense of participants' right to know of their
involvement.
-remote risks with a very low incidence associated with proposed care or test-
ing, and
-risks either unknown to the clinician at the time consent is obtained or that in
exercise of reasonable care could not be ascertained.
OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 98-99.
142. OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 102.
143. Id. at 104. "Researchers ... [divulging] such information could convince subject
to participate in research on the basis of misinformation, unreasonable expectation, or for
the sole purpose of financial gain." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972).
147. See ANNAS et al., supra note 31, at 261.
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B. Effecting Adequate Disclosure
This note proposes a two-part approach to protecting patients
from inadequate disclosure of their physicians' conflicting commer-
cial interests. On one level, physicians can address this problem
within the profession through self-regulation and enforcement. On
another level, the current language of the federal regulations guid-
ing human research can be modified to include research performed
on diagnostic specimens received from patients undergoing medical
treatment.
1. Self-regulation by the Profession
Traditional codes of medical ethics focus on the moral obliga-
tions of physicians and health-care professionals rather than on the
rights of patients."' The Hippocratic Oath, for example, empha-
sizes the fundamental principles of beneficence and
nonmaleficence 49 The ethical code of the American Medical As-
sociation (AMA) has, to some extent, moved away from the prima-
cy of the physician's obligation reflected in the Hippocratic Oath
to account for patients' right to self-determination.15
Although the code of ethics promulgated by the AMA is not
law, it is considered the standard by which "a physician [should]
determine the propriety of his conduct in his relationship with [his]
patients.""' Language requiring full disclosure of possible eco-
nomic conflicts of interest should be added to medical codes of
ethics to ensure that physicians fulfill their fiduciary obligations.
Doctors' commercial interests in their patients' tissues should be
characterized as a material fact to be disclosed in obtaining general
consent to treatment procedure. Such additional language could be
enforced through sanctions by appropfiate Medical Boards of Re-
view in state professional associations.
148. See, e.g., THOMAS A. MAPPES AND JANE S. ZEMBATY, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 45
(1981) ('Physicians are expected to perform those actions which will benefit their patients
and to refrain from performing those that will harm them.").
149. Id. ("Benefit and do no harm to the patient.").
150. See Abstract of Proceedings of the House of Delegates of the American Medical
Association at the Annual Meeting in New York; June 3-7, 1957, 164 JAMA 1099, 1119-
20 (July 6, 1957) (noting that the 1957 version of the AMA ethical code characterizes
the physician's primary obligation as being "to render service to humanity with full re-
spect for the dignity of manfl").
151. Id. at 1119.
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The effectiveness of additional language pertaining to the dis-
closure of commercial gain may, however, be limited. A recent
survey of medical house officers' knowledge and attitudes regard-
ing medical ethics indicates that most residency programs have
only recently begun to include training with respect to the ethics of
patient care.152 The findings further indicate that house officers'
knowledge of ethical rules declines as the time since the officers'
post-graduate training increases.153 This trend suggests that physi-
cians who have been in practice for a number of years are less
attentive to their ethical responsibilities. However, the study did
show that ethical awareness is enhanced when educational interven-
tion was provided for house officers who completed residency
programs a number of years earlier."5 Therefore, educational in-
tervention combined with the changes in the medical ethics codes
would help to ensure that physicians are aware of their obligation
to disclose commercial conflicts.
2. Legislative Response
At this time, the federal regulations guiding research involving
human subjects specifically exempts research on diagnostic speci-
mens. 55 These regulations could be amended to eliminate this
exemption so that research funded by the Department of Health
and Human Services involving diagnostic specimens would also
have to follow the statutory informed consent procedures. 1" The
OTA Report noted that identification of specific human sources
would be difficult in many instances, and therefore suggested that
disclosure of potential commercial gain be limited to those situa-
tions where there is a high probability of "marketable biological
material" being extracted from the tissue of an identified sub-
152. Daniel P. Sulmasy et al., Medical House Officers' Knowledge, Attitudes, and Confi-
dence Regarding Medical Ethics, 150 ARCHis INTERN. MED. 2509, 2509 (1990).
mhe goals of such training are to enhance patient care by (1) imparting
knowledge of ethics vocabulary and established principles of ethical analysis
and of relevant legal and historical facts, and (2) fostering skills that enhance
the ability of physicians to communicate with patients, with families, with col-
leagues, and with professionals outside the health care field regarding ethical
issues.
Id.
153. Id. at 2512.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
156. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (requirements for informed consent).
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ject. 157
An easier alternative exists. Rather than undertaking identifica-
tion of the potential value of any one research subject's tissue,
physicians who choose to conduct research on tissues acquired
through therapeutic procedures should be required to make a gener-
al disclosure to each patient from whom tissue might be used.
Mere disclosure that the subject's tissue might be used in research
that could result in financial gain to the attending physician would
suffice. Patients who have strong concerns that their physicians'
economic interests may compromise treatment decisions can have
necessary procedures performed by other physicians.
Simply amending the federal regulations to reflect such a re-
quirement presents some difficulties. First, the federal regulations
will not affect every research situation because not all research is
federally funded. Nevertheless, governments fund a significant
amount of medical research and promulgating new disclosure regu-
lations to accompany those funds is at least a step in the right
direction.1 58  States could supplement federal regulations with
analogous disclosure rules and could include sanctions in state li-
censing schemes to encourage compliance with all disclosure re-
quirements.
Second, initiatives to protect patients' right to self-determination
and to prevent abuse of trust by physicians-fiduciaries should not
create a significant hindrance to the valuable research conducted on
the specimens obtained from patients. 59 However, if patients are
entitled only to know of potential commercial gain but not to share
in profits realized, the incentive to conduct research should not be
inhibited.
Third, enforcement may be cumbersome because some type of
verification disclosure form documenting compliance with the new
regulations will have to accompany each diagnostic specimen.
However, the benefits of preserving patients' basic disclosure rights
157. OTA REPORT, supra note 16, at 107.
158. Federal and state governments contribute significant funds to support the biotech-
nology industry. In 1987, the federal figure exceeded $2.6 billion while some 33 states
contributed over $100 million. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 1-2 (1987).
159. See Lavoie, supra note 11, at 1368-69 (discussing the importance of governmental
support for the biotechnology industry). See also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
793 P.2d 479, 487 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1388 (1991) (expressing concern
that tort liability for use of patients' tissues in research could adversely affect medical
research).
[Vol. 42:565
ECONOMIC INTERETS IN PATIENT8" CELLS
outweigh the burden on physicians of requiring their patients to
read and sign one additional form prior to treatment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Requiring disclosure of potential commercial gain by physicians
who treat patients and conduct research on specimens taken from
them opens important lines of communication between doctor and
patient with respect to the underlying medical procedures. This
communication is consistent with the fiduciary role of physicians
and enhances the patient's ability to make a fully informed deci-
sion regarding the treatment recommended and the physician best
suited to provide the necessary care.
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